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Evaluating a "Concussion Clause":
Why the NFL's Assumption of Risk




This Article explores the future of National Football League
(NFL) concussion litigation. Currently, hundreds of retired NFL players
who previously brought negligence claims against the NFL are seeking
compensation under a settlement agreement reached in 2012. With
many retired players exempting themselves from the 2012 agreement
and current players learning more about the long-term risks of football,
the potential for future negligence lawsuits against he NFL is still ripe.
In any such suit, a key issue will be the NFLs'assumption of risk defense.
The allure of the defense is intuitive-when one chooses to play
professional football for a living, he assumes the risk of injuries
associated with the game. Further, as information about concussions
and chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) continues to saturate the
public dialogue, players will become more informed about the risks of
CTE, strengthening the NFL's potential assumption of risk defense.
This Article challenges that intuition through a hypothetical
scenario: Were the NFL to ask its players to sign a "Concussion Clause"
waiver, much like the waivers skiers are required to sign before getting
on a ski lift, would the waiver be enforceable? If not, then why should
any assumption of risk defense be successful? To wrestle with this
hypothetical scenario, this Article first evaluates tort law doctrine on
assumption of risk, laying out the background of express and implied
assumption of risk defenses and their historical applications in football.
In applying the assumption of risk doctrine to a hypothetical
Concussion Clause, this Article reaches a peculiar result. While a
Concussion Clause would likely violate public policy and, therefore, be
Judicial Law Clerk, the Honorable David C. Godhey, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas.
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unenforceable under current doctrine, the NFL could still prevail using
an implied assumption of risk defense. This is largely because tort
doctrine places tremendous weight on the distinction between inherent
and extraneous risks. While the former can be assumed implicitly and
avoid triggering scrutiny on public policy grounds, the latter can only be
assumed through an explicit waiver that is consistent with public policy.
So long as concussions and CTE are characterized as inherent risks to
football, an implied assumption of risk defense could theoretically be
upheld, even if an express waiver for the same risks would violate public
policy. This Article concludes by challenging this outcome on both
doctrinal and policy grounds, and recommends that courts recognize
public policy objections to the implied assumption of risk defense.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"It's bad for football."' This was the blunt summary offered by
analyst Jon Gruden after a particularly brutal Monday night football
matchup between the Pittsburgh Steelers and Cincinnati Bengals in
late 2017.2 The game showcased the dark side to a sport that has
captivated the United States for nearly a century. Every play seemed
to result in injury. Players were critically injured on the field; some
after suffering questionable blows delivered after the whistle.3 Two
players had to be stretchered off the field due to their injuries.4 One
player even had to undergo immediate spinal stabilization surgery to
avoid permanent paralysis.5
The game was, as Hall of Fame quarterback Troy Aikman
described, "hard to watch."6 And in the days following the matchup, it
reinvigorated a conversation that has crept into countless US living
rooms: is football too dangerous and should measures be taken to make
it safer?
Players began to participate in the national dialogue almost
immediately.7 In an interview shortly after the game, Pittsburgh's
Mike Mitchell made it very clear that for him, football is a matter of
informed choice.8 "Safer" football, for Mitchell, would no longer be true
football:
Just hand us all some flags. Hand us all some flags, and we'll go out there and try to
grab the flags off. Because we're not playing football[.] ... This is not damn football.
1. Jason Owens, Jon Gruden Leads Wave of Criticism over Violence in Steelers-Bengals




3. See id.; Bryan Armen Graham, Steelers-Bengals Brutality a Reminder Life-Altering
Violence Is at NFL's Core, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2017, 2:03 PM),
https1/www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2017/dec/05/steelers-bengals-game-violence-ryan-
shazier-nfl [https*//perma.ccIN9JR-44XB].
4. See Graham, supra note 3.
5. See Mark W. McFarland, Ryan Shazier - From Paralysis to Standing - A Cause for
Celebration!, ORTHOPAEDIC & SPINE CTR. (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.osc-ortho.com/blog/ryan-
shazier-paralysis-standing-cause-celebration/ [https//perma.cc/J53G-VWMK].
6. Troy Aikman (@TroyAikman), TWITTER (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:41 PM),
https://twitter.com/TroyAikman/status/937904747427893250 [https//perma.cctW2ZZ-CTL5].
7. See Brett Williams, American Football Won't Last Much Longer, Because It's Killing
Itself, MASHABLE (Dec. 10, 2017), https-/mashable.com/2017/12/10/football-is-kilhing-
itselfbLY5CL99MPqd [https*//perma.cc/3TPN-S6J4].
8. See Jeremy Fowler, Steelers Safety Mike Mitchell Rips Officiating. 'Just Hand Us All
Some Flags, ESPN (Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/21693373/pittaburgh-
steelers-safety-mike-mitchell-upset-stance-hard-hits-nfl [https://perma.cc/MH8V-5KKE].
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When I was six years old watching Charles Woodson, Rod Woodson, Sean Taylor,
the hitters, Jack Tatum. That's football. This ain't football. You have to know the
risk when you sign up.... It's football. It's no different than UFC fighting. This a
combat, contact sport. There's gonna be injuries. That's just what it is. But if you
don't want to get injured, don't come out here.9
Mitchell is not the first to make the point,o and every indication
suggests that he will not be the last." In a 2010 ESPN poll of three
hundred prep football players, 45 percent replied "Yes" when asked if a
"good chance" of playing in the National Football League (NFL) was
worth a "decent chance" of permanent brain damage.12
Counterintuitively, in a survey of three hundred twenty prospective
senior high school players two years later-after more information had
been released about concussions-that percentage increased to nearly
54 percent.'3
Retired players, however, seem to view the situation differently.
Since 2011, former players have filed over two hundred complaints
against the NFL regarding its duties to protect players from the chronic
risks created by concussive and subconcussive head injuries.14 The
suits raise five major claims: negligence, negligent misrepresentation,
fraud, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy.15 The most common
claim by far, however, is ordinary negligence based on a breach of the
duty to take reasonable precautions for players' safety.16 These cases
against the NFL were consolidated in 2012 as multidistrict litigation in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.'7 The parties eventually reached a settlement that
Judge Brody of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania approved and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on appeal
affirmed.'8
9. Id.
10. Quarterback Jay Cutler and Wide Receiver Brian Hartline have both made similar
points. See Robert Klemko, You Can't Please Everybody, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 25, 2013),
https://www.si.com/2013/10/25/players-react-concussion-rules [https://perma.cc/DVX8-SHEJ].




14. See In re Nat'l Football League Players' Concussion Injury Litig. (In re Nat? Football
League 1), 301 F.R.D. 191, 195 (E.D. Pa. 2014), aff'd, 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016).
15. See Plaintiffs Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint at 2, 3, In re
Nat' Football League I, 301 F.R.D. 191 (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB); J. Brad Reich, When "Getting
Your Bell Rung" May Lead to "Ringing the Bell"- Potential Compensation for NFL Player
Concussion-Related Injuries, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 198, 200 (2013).
16. See Reich, supra note 15, at 205.
17. See In re Nat'l Football League I, 301 F.R.D. at 195.
18. The settlement allows compensation to the estate of players who died of CTE, if
confirmed in autopsy. It does not, however, allow for compensation to players diagnosed with CTE
during their lifetime. See id.; In re Nat'1 Football League Players' Concussion Injury Litig., 821
F.3d 410, 423-24, 448 (3d. Cir. 2016).
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As a result, whether the NFL has actually breached its duty of
care to protect players from the risks of traumatic brain injuries has yet
to be fully litigated.19 There remains, however, significant potential for
such a case to be brought to trial. In addition to the several hundred
players who opted out of the settlement, specifically to reserve their
right to sue the NFL at a later date, the agreement notably omitted
CTE diagnosed in living patients as a qualified condition.20 This
omission bars retired players participating in the settlement from
seeking compensation to pay for CTE specific treatment. Initially, this
omission made some degree of sense. After all, because science could
not yet detect with certainty that someone had CTE until that person
died, why pay for treatment for a disease one cannot prove the player
has?21
But times have changed. In addition to a study finding that 99
percent of studied former NFL players' brains had CTE,22 researchers
now know it is in fact possible to diagnose CTE in living patients.23
With this new information, there is good reason to suspect hat current
and retired players are living with CTE, and it is now possible for any
one of those players to be diagnosed during their lifetime.24 By failing
to acknowledge CTE as a qualified condition, the settlement now seems
ill-equipped to fulfill its fundamental purpose of compensating retired
players for health problems associated with their football careers.
19. One question raised with respect to this litigation is whether players can turn to
workers' compensation for relief. See, e.g., Thomas Reiter & Lucas Tanglen, Concussions and
Coverage: Insurance for Claims Alleging Long-Term Brain Injuries, Including CTE, 34 ENT. &
SPORTS L. 3, 16 (2016). These statutes, after all, are the usual form of compensation for employees
injured on the job. See id. The problem, however, is that workers' compensation statutes-at least
for the time being-typically either preempt or exclude recovery for CTE. See CHRISTOPHER
DEUBERT, I. GLENN COHEN & HOLLY FERNANDEz LYNCH, PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE
HEALTH OF NFL PLAYERS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 212, 257-64
(2016); Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians as Co-Employees: A Prescription That Deprives
Professional Athletes of an Adequate Remedy for Sports Medicine Malpractice, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J.
211, 214 (2005). Researchers have recommended advocacy to change these statutes but for the
time being, the courts remain the proper venue for NFL players seeking compensation for their
injuries. See Mitten, supra, at 213.
20. See Michael McCann, Will New CTE Findings Doom the NFL Concussion Settlement?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 15, 2017), https/www.si.com/nfl/2017/08/15/new-cte-study-effect-nfl-
concussion-settlement [https://perma.ce/F6R6-RQV7].
21. See id.
22. See Jesse Mez et al., Clinicopathological Evaluation of Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy in Players of American Football, 318 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 360, 360-70 (2017).
23. See Bennet Omalu et al., Postmortem Autopsy-Confirmation of Antemortem [F-18]
FDDNP-PET Scans in a Football Player with Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, 82
NEUROSURGERY 237, 237-46 (2017).
24. See id.
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Future negligence actions, therefore, remain a looming threat
over the NFL.25 A particularly interesting aspect of any potential future
suit is whether the NFL could raise a viable assumption of risk defense.
That is, could the organization essentially mimic Mike Mitchell's
sentiments in an effort to avoid liability, arguing that players "have to
know the risks when [they] sign up," and if they do not want to get
injured, then they should not play?2 6
Defenses based on plaintiffs' assumption of risk take two forms:
express and implied. Express assumption of risk applies when
plaintiffs have explicitly waived all potential tort claims against the
defendant.27 The viability of this defense largely depends on whether
the waiver is consistent with public policy.2 8 Implied assumption of
risk, however, applies when there is no explicit waiver and protects the
defendant only from liability for injuries resulting from inherent risks
in the activity.29 Although neither form of the defense has been litigated
with respect to the risk of concussions and CTE in professional football,
the prospect of future litigation in this area makes for an intriguing
thought experiment. Namely, which version of the defense-if either-
should provide a persuasive defense for the NFL?
For potential suits in the near future, the implied assumption of
risk defense seems weak. Now-retired players did not know the risks
of traumatic brain injuries when they decided to play decades ago.30
The essence of their negligence claim is that the league either knew or
should have known about these risks and accordingly should have done
more to ensure that players made a truly informed choice when they
decided to play professional football.3 '
As time goes on, however, the information asymmetries between
the league and its players will diminish. The link between CTE and
professional football has garnered an increasing amount of scholarly32
25. Several commentators have attempted to predict how courts will react to such an
action. See, e.g., David S. Cerra, Unringing the Belk Former Players Sue NFL and Helmet
Manufacturers over Concussion Risks in Maxwell v. NFL, 16 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 265, 282-
84 (2012); John Guccione, Moving Past a 'Pocket Change" Settlement: The Threat of Preemption
and How the Loss of Chance Doctrine Can Help NFL Concussion Plaintiffs Prove Causation, 22
J.L. & POL'Y 909, 944 (2014); Joseph M. Hanna, Concussions May Prove to Be a Major Headache
for the NFL: Players' Class Action Suit Places a Bounty on the League, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 2012, at
10, 14; Reich, supra note 15, at 200; Ashley J. Adams, Note, Intercollegiate Concussions: What the
NCAA Can Do to Ease the Pain from an Inevitable Headache, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 193, 218-19 (2014).
26. Fowler, supra note 8.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
28. See id.
29. See § 496C. For a detailed examination of both express and implied assumption of risk
defenses, see infra Part II.
30. See Reich, supra note 15, at 200.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., Omalu et al., supra note 23, at 237-46.
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and popular attention.33 Thus, the players of today and tomorrow
theoretically should be fully aware of the risks, irrespective of what
action the league takes. Further, as incoming players and the public
grow more informed, judges and juries may be more inclined to find that
these players have knowingly assumed the risk of CTE as a risk of
playing. It indeed seems that the league's implied assumption of risk
defense only grows stronger with time.
This Article challenges this logic34 by wrestling with a
hypothetical scenario: Were the NFL to ask its players to sign a
"Concussion Clause" waiver, would an express assumption of risk
defense be upheld? In that hypothetical world, the information
asymmetries that existed in the past would be fully resolved. But would
that waiver be legally enforceable? And if that express waiver would
not be upheld, why should tort law allow players to assume the same
risks impliedly through their conduct?
To answer these questions, this Article proceeds in three parts.
Part II evaluates tort law doctrine on assumption of risk, detailing the
background of express and implied assumption of risk defenses and
their historical application in football. Part III addresses the above
Concussion Clause hypothetical, concluding that any waiver
exculpating the NFL for concussion injuries would likely violate public
policy and would thus be legally unenforceable. The puzzle, however,
lies in the fact that the NFL could still advance a potentially viable
implied assumption of risk defense despite such a waiver being
unenforceable for violating public policy.
This seemingly contradictory outcome is largely due to the
tremendous weight tort doctrine places on the distinction between
inherent and extraneous risks. While the former can be assumed
impliedly and without triggering scrutiny on public policy grounds, the
latter can only be assumed through an explicit waiver consistent with
public policy. As long as concussions and CTE are characterized as
inherent risks of football, courts could theoretically uphold an implied
33. See, e.g., Alipour et al., supra note 11, at 93; Williams, supra note 7.
34. While this Article is not the first to approach the viability of the NFL's assumption of
risk defense going forward, it is the first to evaluate the concept of a Concussion Clause. See infra
Part III. Some scholars have turned to the science of concussions to argue that, even if the players
knew and understood the risks of traumatic brain injuries when they decided to play, they can
never be said to have made an informed choice to return to the field after suffering a concussion.
See, e.g., Tracey B. Carter, From Youth Sports to Collegiate Athletics to Professional Leagues: Is
There Really '7nformed Consent"by Athletes Regarding Sports-Related Concussions?, 84 UMKC L.
REV. 331, 351-53 (2015); Heather MacGillivray, Where Is the Awareness in Concussion Awareness:
Can Concussed Players Really Assume the Risk in a Concussed State?, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 529, 555-57 (2014). This Article, confronts the NFL's defense with a more wholesale
approach. It steps away from the nuances of informed choice and instead argues that that the
league's defense should fail for being inconsistent with the principles of tort law.
2019] 657
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assumption of risk defense even if an express waiver for the same risks
would violate public policy. Part IV challenges this outcome on three
grounds, arguing that courts should recognize public policy objections
to the implied assumption of risk defense. First, the line between
inherent and extraneous risks is murky and full of complications,
making it an unusable legal standard. Second, only using a policy
backstop for express assumption of risk is inconsistent with the basic
principle in tort law of using policy to inform duty determinations.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, failing to recognize public policy
objections to implied assumption of risk is inconsistent with the
Restatement and both the compensation and deterrence goals of tort
law. Part V briefly concludes and offers some recommendations.
II. EVALUATION OF THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEFENSE
A. Assumption of Risk Background
When Judge Cardozo first articulated the assumption of risk
defense, he envisioned it as a fairly simple concept. As he summarized
assumption of risk, "the timorous may stay at home."35 Since 1929,
however, the defense has evolved into a much more nuanced,
multidimensional aspect of tort law. Today, it takes three main forms:
primary implied assumption of risk, secondary implied assumption of
risk, and express assumption of risk.
1. Primary Implied Assumption of Risk
The first and most prominent form of the assumption of risk
defense is primary implied assumption of risk. In this version of the
defense, the plaintiff voluntarily enters into a risky activity and,
therefore, has relieved the defendant of a duty to protect him from the
risks inherent in that activity.36 Under primary implied assumption of
risk, liability attaches only "where the defendant intentionally injures
or engages in reckless, willful or wanton misconduct beyond the scope
ordinarily contemplated for the activity."37 Determining the ordinary
scope of an activity is a question reserved for judges and has proven to
be quite the legal challenge.38
35. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. (c)(2) (AM. IAW INST. 1979).
37. Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk in the Arena, on the Field and in the Mosh
Pit: What Protection Does It Afford?, 13 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 4 (1995).
38. See id. at 6-7.
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A classic example of this puzzle is the New York case, Turcotte
v. Fell.39 A professional jockey, Ronald Turcotte, was injured in a race
when his horse clipped the heels of another horse.40 Turcotte sued the
jockey riding the other horse, the owner of that jockey's horse, and the
owner-operator of the racetrack.4' The defendants responded with- an
assumption of risk defense.42 As the court saw it, the defendants' only
duty was to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be. That is,
the defendants need not have protected Turcotte against "the perfectly
obvious" risks associated with competitive horse racing.43 Because the
risk at issue was "known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable," the
defendants had satisfied their duty."
Had the defendant failed to keep the track in reasonable
condition or concealed another danger, Turcotte's case may have
succeeded. But the court concluded that the risk of horses colliding was
inherent to the sport and patently obvious to an experienced rider like
Turcotte.45 Though dated, the example highlights the intuitive point
Cardozo playfully articulated: If someone knowingly opts into a risky
activity, he accepts the consequences.46 The only duty of the defendant
is to protect against risks beyond those inherent to the activity.
2. Secondary Implied Assumption of Risk
Unlike primary implied assumption of risk, the defendant in
secondary implied assumption of risk cases argues that the plaintiff was
"aware of [the] risk created by the negligence of the defendant, [and]
proceed[ed] or continue[d] voluntarily to encounter it."47 The key
difference between primary and secondary implied assumption of risk
is what the plaintiff knew going into the activity. In primary implied
assumption of risk, the plaintiff is said to have known of and consented
to the risks inherent to a dangerous activity.4 8 In secondary implied
assumption of risk, the plaintiff is assumed to have known of and
consented to a particular risk caused by the defendant's negligence.49




43. Id. at 968.
44. Id.
45. In an interesting parallel to the NFL's assumption of risk defense, the court found it
particularly relevant that Turcotte was a professional, noting that "a professional athlete is more
aware of the dangers of the activity, and presumably more willing to accept them in exchange for
a salary, than is an amateur." Id. at 969.
46. See id. at 968.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. (c) (AM. L.INST. 1979).
48. See Drago, supra note 37, at 4.
49. See id. at 5.
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As it relates to CTE litigation, primary assumption of risk is far
more important. Secondary assumption of risk does not operate as a
complete defense, "but has been merged with contributory negligence
under comparative fault laws."" Under this defense, the NFL would
argue that while it may have been negligent, so too were the players for
deciding to play. A jury would have to balance the faults and
reasonableness of both parties under the relevant state's comparative
fault laws.5 1
If the NFL's only line of defense became secondary implied
assumption of risk, in other words, the legal analysis of the case would
be relatively clear. The focus would turn to how a jury should approach
the factual question of fault. This is why the viability of a primary
assumption of risk defense is far more puzzling. One question of law-
whether or not a risk is within the "ordinary scope of an activity"-
determines whether the defendant is granted a complete defense. As
such, this Article focuses on the NFL's use of a primary implied
assumption of risk defense.
3. Express Assumption of Risk
In cases concerning express assumption of risk, the plaintiff and
defendant have entered into a private agreement altering their rights
and obligations under tort law.5 2 In some ways, express assumption of
risk is the explicit version of its implied counterparts. The key
difference, however, is that while a plaintiff subject to primary implied
assumption of risk defense can still sue for dangers beyond the ordinary
scope of the activity, the plaintiff subject to an express assumption of
risk defense has usually "agree[d] to accept a risk of harm arising from
the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct."58 In other words, under
implied assumption of risk, defendants can still be sued if they fail to
meet their duty of care relating to noninherent risks. In contrast, the
defendant cannot be sued at all under express assumption of the risk.
Express assumption of risk provides the defendant with far more
protection. To return to the example of Turcotte, an implied assumption
of risk defense would not bar the jockey from suing the racetrack for a
risk that is extraneous to jockeying-say, if the seating area collapsed
on him. But an express assumption of risk would foreclose even that
claim if it were enforced.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See David Horton, Extreme Sports and Assumption of Risk- A Blueprint, 38 U.S.F. L.
REV. 599, 616 (2004).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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With added protection, however, comes added scrutiny.
Exculpatory waivers must meet two requirements to be enforced. First,
the waiver must clearly and unequivocally express the parties' intent
to release the defendant from liability for his negligent acts.54
Specifically, courts have found that a release "must appear plainly and
precisely apparent hat the limitation of liability extends to negligence
or other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary
responsibility."55
Second, and more often the subject of litigation, the waiver must
not violate public policy. 56 While states have slightly different
approaches to this question, the majority of jurisdictions evaluate
waivers on six grounds: (1) whether the activity is usually regulated, (2)
whether the activity is of great importance to the public, (3) whether
the activity is open to the public, (4) whether there is unequal
bargaining power between the parties, (5) whether the waiver can be
construed as a contract of adhesion, and (6) whether the plaintiff is
under the defendant's control.57 These factors, and the other tests
employed by states for evaluating waivers on public policy grounds, are
explored in greater detail below.
B. Historical Application of Assumption of Risk in Football
While the most recent NFL concussion litigation was settled
before trial, courts have tackled assumption of risk defenses with
respect to both professional and amateur football.5 In these cases,
distinguishing between risks that are inherent and extraneous to the
game has been a particularly challenging task for courts. This
preliminary question of law has an enormous impact on the case. If the
judge ultimately decides a risk is inherent, much like in Turcotte, the
defendant's implied assumption of risk defense is viable. 9 If, however,
54. See Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Ct.
App. 1993); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981); Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309
(N.Y. 1979); Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk- An Age-Old Defense Still Viable in Sports
and Recreation Cases, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 583, 585-86 (2002).
55. Gross, 400 N.E.2d at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Howard v.
Handler Bros. & Winell, Inc., 107 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951), affd, 303 N.E.2d 990
(N.Y. 1952)).
56. See Drago, supra note 54, at 588.
57. See TunkI v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963).
58. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir. 1979);
Rutter v. Ne. Beaver Cty. School Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Pa. 1981); Claims in NFL Concussion




59. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 969 (N.Y. 1986).
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the judge decides the risk is extraneous, implied assumption of risk does
not apply.0
The seminal case in the professional football realm is Hackbart
v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.61 The case concerned an incident during a
regular season game in which the Bengals' player Charles Clark
intentionally "stepped forward and struck a blow with his right forearm
to the back of the kneeling plaintiffs head and neck."6 2 The plaintiff
suffered injuries from the blow that eventually forced him to retire.63
The issue in the case was whether the NFL could be held liable
for the injury because it was "inflicted by the intentional striking of a
blow" or if it was protected by assumption of risk." The trial court ruled
in the NFL's favor.65 As the trial judge saw it, "Hackbart had to
recognize that he accepted the risk that he would be injured by such an
act."66
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, took a different approach. The panel emphasized that
the rules of football specifically prohibit these kinds of intentional
blows.67 As a result, the court concluded that the trial court wrongfully
"determined that as a matter of social policy the game was so violent
and unlawful that valid lines could not be drawn."" They found instead
that the lines were perfectly clear as articulated by the rules of the
game.69 Since these rules prohibited intentional hits, the "plaintiff was
entitled to have the case tried on an assessment of his rights and
whether they had been violated."70 The court accordingly remanded the
60. See, e.g., Rutter, 437 A.2d at 1208.
61. See Hackbart, 601 F.2d.
62. Id. at 519. A similar incident took place during the 2017-2018 NFL season in a game
between the New England Patriots and Buffalo Bills. Tight end Rob Gronkowski, after the play,
charged into the back of the Cornerback Tre'Davious White's head and neck. Gronkowski was
suspended for one game. No litigation has been filed. See Kaleel Weatherly, Rob Gronkowski
Suspended 1 Game for Late Hit on Bills' Tre'Davious White, SB NATION (Dec. 5, 2017, 5:25 PM),
https://www.sbnation.com/2017/12/4/16733394/rob-gronkowski-suspended-patriots-bis-
tredavious-white-hit [https://perma.cclMS2G-H4HQ].
63. See Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 519; High Court Upholds Injury Suit in N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 1979), https//www.nytimes.com/1979/10/30/archives/high-court-upholds-injury-suit-in-
nfl-hackbart-retired-after-injury.html [https://perma.cc/SET5-632E].
64. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 518.
65. Id. at 519.
66. Id.
67. Se id. at 521.
68. Id. at 526.
69. Id. at 521.
70. Id. at 526.
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case for a new trial, but Hackbart subsequently opted to settle his
claims.7 '
Hackbart can be read as limiting the reach of implied
assumption of risk. The court effectively concluded that the NFL rules
that the players knew when they put on their helmets defined what was
inherent to, or within the ordinary scope of, football in 1979. The rules
of the game are the boundary lines for what is inherent under Hackbart.
Courts handling cases involving amateur football have reached
similar conclusions. In Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School
District, a school district raised an assumption of risk defense against
a high school football player suing for injuries he sustained during a
preseason training drill where he was required to play without
protective equipment.72 The court emphasized whether playing without
protective equipment presented risks that were inherent to football.
While the court noted that "[o]ne possibility [was] that he assumed the
risk of all injuries related to training for and playing football," they
ultimately decided that he only assumed the risk of "injuries related to
training for and playing football while under the direction of coaches
who furnished watchful supervision and protective equipment when
needed."73 As a result, implied assumption of risk did not protect the
defendant.74
Thus, when presented with the issue of injuries relating to
football, courts have consistently narrowed the applicability of implied
assumption of risk defensbs. Furthermore, no court has yet interpreted
the applicability of an express assumption of risk defense to football-
related head injuries. The question of how much risk a football player
legally assumes when he decides to play is, therefore, ripe for
exploration.
III. EVALUATING A CONCUSSION CLAUSE
Were the NFL to defend a negligence suit in court today based
on a concussion injury, asserting an implied assumption of risk defense
would likely prove futile. After all, players currently suing the league
were very much unaware of the risks of concussions, CTE, and
traumatic brain injuries when they first picked up a helmet decades
ago.75
71. See Hackbart in Settlement with Bengals on Injury, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 1981),
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/05/sports/hackbart-in-settlement-with-bengals-on-injury.html
[https://perma.cc/69XZ-CLSE].
72. Rutter v. Ne. Beaver Cty. Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1200 (Pa. 1981).
73. Id. at 1207-08 (emphasis added).
74. See id. at 1209.
75. See, e.g., Omalu et al., supra note 23, at 244.
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As time goes on, however, this argument loses its potency. With
the link between CTE and football drawing increased attention, the
information asymmetry that existed in years past is closing. Thus, the
league's implied assumption of risk defense grows stronger with time.
In a future negligence suit, an implied assumption of risk defense may
be persuasive and, curiously, it may fare better than its express
assumption of risk counterpart.
This section evaluates whether this counterintuitive outcome
should be the case by taking the logic of full disclosure to the extreme.
Imagine the NFL had its players sign a completely comprehensive
exculpatory waiver before putting on a helmet-a Concussion Clause.
In that world, where the information asymmetries are entirely cured,
is the assumption of risk defense stronger? That is, would the NFL be
able to rely on an express assumption of risk defense? And if not, why
would players be allowed to assume risks impliedly that they are barred
from assuming by contract?
A. Requirements for Enforceability
-As noted above, there are two requirements for an express
assumption of risk to be enforceable. First, the waiver's scope must be
clearly defined.76 For the purposes of the hypothetical Concussion
Clause, assume that this requirement is satisfied and that the NFL's
waiver unambiguously explains that the player waives any rights to sue
for concussion-related injuries, regardless of whether those injuries
resulted from the inherent aspects of the game or the defendant's
negligence.77
The second requirement is that the waiver be consistent with
public policy.7 8 There is no single way to answer this question, as the
issue is largely a creature of state law. The most common approach,
however, is to refer to the six factors laid out in Tunkl v. Regents of the
University of California.79 Tunkl involved an exculpatory waiver a
California hospital required patients to sign before admission.0 When
the plaintiff brought a negligence suit against he hospital, the hospital
pointed to the waiver as its defense.8 '
76. See Drago, supra note 37, at 3.
77. See id. at 3. Interestingly, some scholars have expressed doubt as to whether such a
waiver could actually be so comprehensive. See id. at 4. But for the purposes of this hypothetical,
the Author assumes that this first requirement has been met.
78. See Drago, supra note 54, at 588.
79. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1963).
80. Id. at 442.
81. Id. at 442.
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The California Supreme Court ultimately found the waiver
unenforceable because it "affect[ed] the public interest."82 The court
reached its conclusion by evaluating the waiver in light of six public
policy factors:
(1) that "[i]t concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation";
(2) that "[t]he party seeking exculpation is engaged in
performing a service of great public importance, which is often a
matter of practical necessity for some members of the public";
(3) that "[t]he party holds himself out as willing to perform
the service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least
for any member coming within certain established standards";
(4) that there is a "decisive advantage of bargaining
strength against any member of the public";
(5) that the waiver represents a contract of adhesion, and
allows for "no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional
reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence"; and
(6) that the transaction places the "person or property of
the purchaser under the control of the seller."83
An often-criticized aspect of the Tunkl holding, however, is that
the court gave little guidance on how courts should weigh these
factors.8 ' While the court noted that the "agreement need only fulfill
some of the [above] characteristics," it failed to provide any further
guidance on how to actually execute the public policy analysis.8
Still, the cases applying Tunkl reveal some important patterns.
For one thing, when the matter involves public agencies or common
carriers impacting a large portion of the public, courts tend to find all
six factors present." In Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, for
example, the Washington Supreme Court invalidated a school district's
82. Id. at 447.
83. Id. at 445-46.
84. See, e.g., Negligence-Exculpatory Clauses-School Districts Cannot Contract Out of
Negligence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics-Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, 110 Wash.
2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988), 102 HARV. L. REV. 729, 735 (1989) [hereinafter Harvard Law Review
Association].
85. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447.
86. See, e.g., Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metro. L.A., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168, 178 (Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that services that affect the public interest-like childcare-cannot contract away their
duty to exercise ordinary care); Okura v. U.S. Cycling Fed'n, 231 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431-32 (Ct. App.
1986) (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to a cycling organization); Covenant Health &
Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695, 703 (Miss. 2009)
(reaching a similar conclusion with respect to nursing homes); Sw. Public Serv. Co. v. Artesia
Alfalla Growers' Ass'n, 353 P.2d 62, 71 (N.M. 1960) (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to
a public utility company).
2019] 665
666 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 21:3:651
requirement that parents release schools from negligence liability
before their children could participate in school athletics.87 The
Wagenblast court placed significant weight on the fact that, since the
schools were a part of the public education system, these waivers
impacted a large number of students.8 In light of this, the court
promptly found that all six Tunkl factors pointed against enforcing the
waiver: interscholastic sports and public schools were already
"extensively regulated"; they were certainly a "matter of [great] public
importance" and "open to all students who meet certain skills and
eligibility standards"; there was a stark disparity in bargaining power,
as there was no equivalent to interscholastic competition and the school
districts gave no option to pay for protection from negligence; and the
students were under the complete control of the school's coaches.89
The same type of analysis guided the Tunkl court. There, the
seminal fact was that the waiver was drawn up by a public hospital.0
Accordingly, the court found that this was a type of business typically
regulated, that the business was important to and open to the public,
and that there was a disparity in bargaining power because patients
were not in a position to leave and go to another hospital.9 '
This trend is not surprising. After all, if the defendant is a public
agency, the first set of factors-common regulation, public importance,
and public availability-are by definition met. In addition, because
public agencies, by their nature, are not driven by competition, there
will likely be some disparity in bargaining power between the plaintiff
and defendant.
When the entity attempting to enforce the waiver is nonpublic,
however, courts are more divided. Some courts have refused to apply
the public policy exception at all in such cases.92 In Marshall v. Blue
Springs Corporation, for example, an Indiana state court found that a
liability waiver used by a scuba instruction company was not
inconsistent with public policy because the plaintiff chose to take the
lessons solely for "his own personal enjoyment" and "was under no
compulsion by an outside force to do so."9 3
Still, other courts have extended the doctrine to purely
recreational activities when there are stark disparities in bargaining
87. Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 970 (Wash. 1988).
88. Id. at 973.
89. Id. at 972-73.
90. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Marshall v. Blue Springs Corp., 641 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
93. Id. at 95--96; see also Espinoza v. Ark. Valley Adventures, ILC, 809 F.3d 1150, 1157
(10th Cir. 2016) (holding a release was enforceable against a guest of a rafting company who died
rafting largely because the service was not a matter of "practical necessity").
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power.94  The key case is Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant
Corporation.95 After consulting the Tunkl factors, the Connecticut
Supreme Court found that a snow tubing company's waiver was
inconsistent with public policy largely because (1) the defendant
provided the services to the general public, suggesting the activity was
reasonably safe; (2) the plaintiff came directly under the defendant's
control; and (3) there was an inherent disparity in bargaining power
between the two parties, resulting in a contract of adhesion.6 It did not
matter that the activity was purely voluntary and recreational.9 7 The
court found there was still a "public policy interest of promoting
vigorous participation in such activities," and there can still be a
"disparity of bargaining power in the context of voluntary or elective
activities."9 8 Courts throughout the country have followed Hanks and
struck down waivers in cases involving nonpublic entities when there
is a stark disparity in bargaining power.9 Thus, it seems that the
jurisdictions that impose Tunkl tend to boil the analysis down into two
basic questions: (1) whether the defendant is a public entity and (2)
whether there is a disparity in bargaining power.
Interestingly, states that do not use Tunkl also tend to focus on
these basic questions. Idaho, for instance, "limits the ban on
exculpatory clauses to situations in which 'one party is at an obvious
disadvantage in bargaining power or a public duty is involved."' 00
Kansas, on the other hand, focuses on the public nature of the entity by
asking whether the waiver injures "the interests of the public or
contravenes some established interest of society, violates some public
statute, or tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety."101
In sum, there is no single way to go about answering the public
policy question. At root, it is a state law question, and states have
developed different ways of handling it. That being said, examining the
various tests states have established, it seems there are two
overarching concerns guiding the analysis: (1) whether the entity is
94. See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 746 (Conn. 2005).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 745-46.
97. Compare id. at 746, with Espinoza, 809 F.3d at 1157, and Marshall, 641 N.E.2d at 95-
96.
98. Hanks, 885 A.2d at 746.
99. See, e.g., Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27, 30 (Or. 2014) (invalidating a
snowboarding release after finding it to be a contract of adhesion); Reardon v. Windswept Farm,
LLC, 905 A.2d 1156, 1157 (Conn. 2006) (extending Hanks to horseback riding); Berlangieri v.
Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1113 (NM. 2003) (invalidating a resort's horse riding release
after finding it to be a contract of adhesion); Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 796 (Vt. 1995)
(invalidating a ski resort's release after finding it to be a contract of adhesion).
100. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 84, at 732 (quoting Rawlings v. Layne &
Bowler Pump Co., 465 P.2d 107, 111 (Idaho 1970)).
101. Hunter v. Am. Rentals, Inc., 371 P.2d 131, 133-34 (Kan. 1962).
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engaged in activity important to the public and (2) whether there is a
stark disparity in bargaining power. The following Section applies
these questions to the hypothetical Concussion Clause.
B. Requirements Applied to the Concussion Clause
This Section describes how the two most salient Tunkl factors-
public importance and disparities in bargaining power-may apply to
potential NFL litigation. Section III.C draws on these conclusions to
consider the likely fate of the Concussion Clause in court.
1. Professional Football as a Matter of Great Public Importance
The court in Wagenblast held that interscholastic sports are
integral to the public interest because of how closely they are
intertwined with the educational system, emphasizing how "some
students undoubtedly remain in school and maintain their academic
standing only because they can participate in these programs."102
Interscholastic sports, in other words, served the important public
function of furthering education and bettering the lives of youth.103
Similar reasoning characterizes professional football as a matter
of great public importance by being a tool for social mobility. At the
2010 NFL draft, Dez Bryant was drafted fourth overall.'1 After his
name was called, the cameras immediately turned to the hordes of
friends and family surrounding him in his Texas home.105 They were
sobbing, jumping, and cheering.106 Dez Bryant-a man who grew up
with a lock on his refrigerator and routinely knocked on neighbors doors
begging for food stamps-was going to the NFL. 07 It was a dream come
true because for Bryant, like countless other NFL players, getting
drafted was "the way out" of poverty.08
Professional football is inextricably intertwined with race and
socioeconomic status. A recent study by the International Review for
Sociology and Sport suggests that while black NFL draftees come from
102. Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 972 (Wash. 1988).
103. See id.




107. See Paul Solotaroff, Dez Bryant: The Survivor, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 27, 2015, 2:00
PM), https*//www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-sport/dez-bryant-the-survivor-47956/
[https/perma.cclUG2N-QKAK].
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more disadvantaged hometowns than black non-drafted athletes, white
draftees come from communities that are less socioeconomically
disadvantaged than white non-drafted athletes.0 9 The study theorized
that this discrepancy is due, in part, because unlike their white
counterparts, black men from poor communities see football as the most
promising path for upward mobility."10 Indeed, in communities like
Palm Beach County, Florida, "[flootball is salvation itself, a fleeting
window of escape from a place where prison or early death are real and
likely outcomes.""'
In some ways, then, professional football is the extension of the
public policy function noted by the court in Wagenblast. It keeps
children in school, motivates them to take the next step to attend
college, and is viewed in many communities as the key tool for social
mobility. There is, thus, some basis for characterizing professional
football as a matter of great public importance.
2. Disparities in Bargaining Power
Even if professional football cannot be considered a matter of
great public importance, a Concussion Clause may still violate public
policy if one can show a stark disparity in bargaining power.112
Examining the ins and outs of the NFL's procedures, it becomes clear
that a tremendous disparity in bargaining power exists between the
players and the league both in contract negotiations and the league's
capacity to control the rules and conditions of play. This section will
consider each asymmetry in turn.
Unlike contracts in other professional sports leagues, football
contracts are seldom guaranteed."3 Consider the case of Donovan
McNabb. In November 2010, he signed a five-year contract extension
with the Washington Redskins worth $78 million, with incentives that
could have increased the payout to $88 million.114 But after the 2010
109. See Rachel Allison, Adriene Davis & Raymond Barranco, A Comparison of Hometown
Socioeconomics and Demographics for Black and White Elite Football Players in the US, 53 INTL
REV. FOR Soc. SPORT 615, 618 (2018).
110. See id.
111. Mealer, supra note 108.
112. See Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27, 30 (Or. 2014); Reardon v. Windswept
Farm, LLC, 905 A.2d 1156, 1157 (Conn. 2006); Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734,
746 (Conn. 2005); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1113 (N.M. 2003); Dalury v. S-
K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 796 (Vt. 1995).
113. See Dom Cosentino, Why Only the NFL Doesn't Guarantee Contracts, DEADSPIN (Aug.
1, 2017, 11:38 AM), https://deadspin.com/why-only-the-nfl-doesnt-guarantee-contracts-
1797020799 [https://perma.ce/Q9UA-RDD9]. Major League Baseball (MLB) and the National
Hockey League (NHL) both guarantee salaries completely. So too do the vast majority of contracts
in the National Basketball Association (NBA). See id.
114. See id.
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season, McNabb was traded to the Minnesota Vikings and later cut
from the team entirely."5 As a result, McNabb did not receive a penny
of the remaining $70 million after the 2010 season; that money simply
"evaporated into that NFL netherworld of nonguaranteed money.""6
McNabb's story is not unique. The dominant structure of contracts in
the NFL is to offer high numbers over a period of time without
guarantees. This structure is used mainly so that if the player gets
injured or needs to be cut, the team and the league do not lose too much
in the process.117 Football players get injured more often than players
in the MILB, NBA, or NHL by a large margin."18 Their careers are also
far shorter, averaging just around three years."9 If any player were in
need of a contract with a guaranteed payout, it would seem to be the
professional football player. Yet, the going standard in the league is to
offer minimal guarantees.120
Other examples of the uneven bargaining power include the
risky "injury split" contract, in which players agree to slash their
salaries if they end up on the injured reserve,121 as well as the rising
use of per-game bonuses that require players to be on the active
(noninjured) roster each week to get their maximum salary.122
While some superstars may wield enough leverage to negotiate
more favorable contracts,123 the majority of NFL players-the "middle
115. See id.
116. See Brett Martel & Arnie Stapleton, Will NFL Contracts Ever Fully Guarantee?
Players Can Only Hope, USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2017, 3:44 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/09/16/will-nfl-contracts-ever-fully-guarantee-
players-can-hope/105676754/ [https://perma.cc/9TAK-TWVH]. McNabb received $8 million under
the deal. See id.
117. See Cosentino, supra note 113. Darren W. Dummit, Note, Why the NFL May Not be
Free after Clarett, and Why Professional Sports May be Free from Antitrust Law, 8 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 149, 152 (2005). Other rules established by the league and in the Collective Bargaining
Arrangement pose further disincentives for guarantees. For example, the "fully funded rule"
mandates that any full guaranteed salary be placed into escrow at the time of signing, requiring
the owners to part with the money right away. Id.
118. See id.; DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 19, at 1 (mean number of injuries
suffered per game in the NFL is approximately 4.9 times higher than the sum of MLB, NHL, and
NBA leagues).
119. See Rob Arthur, The Shrinking Shelf Life of NFL Players, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 29, 2016,
12:42 AM), https*//www.wsj.com/articles/the-shrinking-shelf-life-of-nfl-players-1456694959
[https://perma.cc/X4SX-DMS2].
120. See Cosentino, supra note 113. While there has been some improvement in this area,
recent studies suggest that "just 44 percent of what was actually contracted was in the form of a
guarantee." See id.
121. For example, Donald Brown's $965,000 deal with New England in 2016 plummeted to
a prorated $453,000 if he got injured. See Kevin Clark, How NFL Lost Their Leverage, RINGER
(Mar. 16, 2017, 8:30 AM), https//www.theringer.com/2017/3/16/16077530/nfl-free-agency-players-
losing-leverage-864759d6cbdb [https*//perma.cc/T2VP-RUD5].
122. This mechanism costed players around $20 million in 2016 alone. See id.
123. On March 13, 2018, for example, quarterback Kirk Cousins made history by signing
the league's first fully guaranteed, three-year, $84 million contract. See Vincent Frank, NFL Free
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class" of sorts-face take-it-or-leave-it deals. Just as "coaches crib
schemes from others, copycat front offices mimic the contract
negotiations occurring elsewhere."124 The result is that the average
player is faced with almost identical deals wherever they "shop," and,
in effect, are presented with contracts of adhesion. They cannot bargain
for more protection in the form of guarantees or leverage their way out
of most structural clauses teams use to limit their compensation.
Instead, they settle and sign deals "well below what's warranted."125 As
former NFL player and current insurer of NFL contracts, Nick Greisen,
describes, "They are a monopoly ... you've only got so many teams and
thousands of players: It's a supply and demand problem that goes on,
and the teams have all the power."1 26
This imbalance of power can also be seen in the league's ability
to control the rules and conditions of play. Perhaps even more so than
the student players in Wagenblast and the recreational snow tubers in
Hanks, NFL players are subject to the unrelenting control of the league.
One example of this is the league's concussion and safety protocol.127
While the National Football League Players' Association (NFLPA) and
NFL worked together to come up with the standards, enforcement
powers rest solely with the league.128
As the 2017 season put on full display, however, whether the
NFL actually enforces the protocol is seldom guaranteed. In 2017 alone,
there were four high profile incidents in which players involved in
harsh, head-to-head tackles clearly displayed symptoms of a concussion
and yet were allowed to return to play in the same game in clear
Agency: Minnesota Vikings to Sign Kirk Cousins to Fully Guaranteed Contract, FORBES (Mar. 13,
2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/vincentfrank/2018/03/13nfl-free-agency-
minnesota-vikings-to-sign-kirk-cousins-to-fully-guaranteed-contract#38b868a51777
[https://perma.cc/58RT-BKEF]. Outside of that deal, however, it is rare for even superstars to
receive fully guaranteed deals. Quarterback Tom Brady's most recent two-year $41 million
contract with New England is one of the few including guarantees, and only $28 million of it is
guaranteed. See Tom Brady, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/new-england-patriots/tom-
brady-4619/ [https://perma.cc/2TCL-Q99Y] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). After being cut from Seattle,
cornerback Richard Sherman-perhaps the best cornerback of this generation-accepted athree-
year, $27.15 million contract with San Francisco that only included $7 million guaranteed. See
Richard Sherman, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/san-francisco-49ers/richard-sherman-
7873/cash-earningsl [https*J/perma.cclM6PN-TRJ3] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
124. Clark, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, SIDELINE CONCUSSION ASSESSMENT TOOL
(2014), https://static.nfl.com/static/content/publi/photo/2014/02/20/0ap20000003270
62.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6F9-SP46].
128. See Eric L. Einhorn, Note, Between the Hash Marks: The Absolute Power the NFL's
Collective Bargaining Agreement Grants Its Commissioner, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 393, 402, 415 (2016).
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violation of the protocol.129 In only one of those instances was a team
subjected to discipline.130 And, of course, those are only the concussions
that are actually reported.13 While self-reported concussions increased
by 9 percent in the 2017 season,132 the culture in the NFL was still, as
quarterback Drew Brees described, "just get back in there, you're fine,
don't worry about it."as And given the prevalent contract structures in
the NFL, that attitude is not surprising. After all, facing things like
injury splits and per-game bonuses, players have a very strong short-
term incentive to stay in the game at all costs.
All that is to say, once players sign their contracts, the league is
the party that sets and enforces the rules, including rules for concussion
safety. Furthermore, in the event a player fails to follow those rules, he
has no functional power or process to protect his interests, as the
Commissioner of the league dominates every aspect of disciplinary
proceedings. Under article 46 of the NFL's Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), the Commissioner not only has the power to
129. Quarterback Matt Moore returned to the game one play after suffering a helmet-to-
helmet hit that left him seemingly dazed on the ground. See Luke Kerr-Dineen, This Disgusting
Cheap Shot Is Everything That's Wrong with the NFL, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2017, 2:37 PM),
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/01/bud-dupree-matt-moore-hit-pittsburgh-steelers-miami-dolphins-
video-suspend [https://perma.cc/LZ2Y-RFGQ]. Quarterback Jacoby Brissett returned to play
without missing any time after a hit that left him on the ground holding his head. See Adam
Kilgore, After a Bad Week, the NFL's Concussion Protocol Comes Under Scrutiny Once Again,
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/11/16/after-a-
bad-week-the-nfls-concussion-protocol-comes-under-scrutiny-once-again/9utmterm=.
fbfae7a5e3ec [https://perma.cc/5Z45-CX78]. Quarterback Russell Wilson returned to play without
being screened after suffering a collision to the jaw that left him visibly confused. See Brady
Henderson, Russell Wilson Needed to Have Jaw Realigned After Getting Hit by Karlos Dansby,
ESPN (Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/21449776/seattle-seahawks-
quarterback-russeH-wilson-needed-jaw-realigned-hit-arizona-cardinals-karlos-dansby
[https://perma.cclRR6R-T4JM]; Mark Maske, Seattle Seahawks Fined $100,000 for Violating NFL
Concussion Protocol with Russell Wilson, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017),
https-1/www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp20l7/12/21/seattle-seahawks-fined-100000-for-
bypassing-concussion-test-on-russell-wilson/9utm erm=.ebed68691022 [https*//perma.cdBY6N-
SR57]. In perhaps most disturbing incident of all, quarterback Tom Savage was allowed to return
to play after enduring a sack that sent him into an immediate impact seizure. See Ken Belson &
Victor Mather, Tom Savage's Return Raises Concussion Protocol Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/1 /sports/football/tom-savage-houston-texans-
concussion.html [https://perma.ccH925-WAAB].
130. The Seattle Seahawks were fined for allowing Russell Wilson to return to play. See
Maske, supra note 129.
131. The NFL recently released a report that there were 291 reported concussions in the
2017 season, a six-year high and up 16.4 percent from 2016. See 2017 Injury Data, NFL: PLAY
SMART PLAY SAFE (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.playsmartplaysafe.com/newsroom/reports/2017-
injury-datal [https://perma.cc/D6LP-CC7H].
132. See Mark Maske, Concussions Suffered by NFL Players Up This Season; Injury Rate




133. Kilgore, supra note 129.
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discipline players for conduct that is "detrimental to the integrity of...
the game of professional football' but also to appoint himself or a person
of his choosing to arbitrate the player's appeal of those decisions.13 4
One problem with this arrangement, however, is that it puts the
Commissioner in an inherently biased position-he has to be impartial
while also working for the owners.35 That is, "if [the Commissioner]
upholds his own disciplinary decision, the NFLPA will challenge his
impartiality since he works for the owners, but if he strikes down or
lowers his punishment, he 'would undermine his own competency as
Commissioner' and would run the risk of being fired by the owners."13 6
The CBAs of the NHL, MLB and NBA are not written this way;
the NFL's stands alone.'37 Legally, it sets up numerous due process
concerns for players.38 Practically, it means that players are subject to
the complete-and ultimately unfettered-discretion of the league
when it comes to the rules of the game. They therefore cannot fairly be
cast as equal parties free to bargain to protect themselves and promote
their interests. Rather, after committing themselves to careers in
football, they have to play by the league's rules-accepting contracts
and procedures that work to their disadvantage.39
134. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1, 204-06 (2011) [hereinafter NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT], httpsJ/nflabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-201l-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FAN-FHW7]. In recent years, Commissioner Roger Goodell has taken
advantage of Article 46. See Einhorn, supra note 130, at 415. In the infamous "Deflategate" scandal
involving Tom Brady and the New England Patriots, Goodell appointed himself as arbitrator, and
in running back Adrian Peterson's disciplinary dispute, he appointed a close associate as
arbitrator. See id. at 414-17.
135. See Einhorn, supra note 128, at 415.
136. Id. at 414 (citing Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat'l Football League Players
Ass'n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).
137. Id. at 402-13.
138. See Sally Jenkins, DeflateGate's Real Issue: Due Process, WASH. POST (July 30, 2015),
https*//www.washingtonpost.com/sports/the-nfls-basic-due-process-is-the-real-issue-in-the-
deflategate-controversy/2015/07/30/ebda3bO2-3666- 11e5-9d0f-7865a67390eestory.
html?utm term=.7a1cl39c639d [https://perma.cc/37A7-Y2PQ]; Greg Kanaan, The NFL Has a
Serious Due Process Problem, and Why Due Process Is Important to Everyone, LEGAL ARTIST (Aug.
3, 2015), http://www.thelegalartist.com/blog/the-nfl-has-a-serious-due-process-problem-and-why-
due-process-is-important-to-everyone [https*/perma.cc/4DA3-LYJ4].
139. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 136, at xiv. It should be
noted that while the NFL does have a Player's Association to advocate on behalf of the athletes, it
actually agreed to the CBA as it is currently written. See id.; Kevin Seifert, DeMaurice Smith:
NFLPA Will Approach 2021 Talks like War, ESPN (Feb 2, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/22291292/demaurice-smith-nflpa-approach-20
2 1-cba-talks-
war [https://perma.ccl43AR-FL9B]. The CBA is set to expire in 2021. See Seifert, supra. The
Association may attempt to change these rules during negotiations for the next CBA, but they
cannot do much to change the rules as they currently stand. See id. Thus, the existence of the
Players' Association does little to improve the current bargaining positions of players. See id.
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C. The Fate of the Concussion Clause: Likely Invalid Under the Tunk1
Test
Any exculpatory waiver established by the NFL would pose
significant public policy issues. First, there is a colorable argument hat
professional football is a matter of great public importance that merits
regulation.140 Even if it is not, however, the disparities in bargaining
power-both in contract negotiations and in the enforcement of league
policies-are quite stark: the majority of players are faced with take-it-
or-leave-it deals; the league has shown a pattern of failing to enforce
policies designed by the NFLPA to keep players safe; and the current
CBA is designed to minimize players' voice in challenging the league's
decisions.
Were the NFL to require its players to sign a Concussion Clause,
it may be deemed unenforceable, at least in some states.141 Again, the
public policy analysis is a creature of state law.14 2 After weighing the
various factors, courts in certain jurisdictions may very well find that
such a waiver does not violate public policy. That fact does not defeat
the analysis above. The point is that prevalent law in multiple
jurisdictions suggests that a hypothetical express assumption of risk
defense would fail.
This creates a peculiar puzzle. While the NFL would likely lose
on an express assumption of risks defense, if a judge were to rule that
the risk of concussions from ordinary play is indeed "inherent" to the
game, the NFL could still win on implied assumption of risk. The latter
does not have a public policy backstop, as courts interpreting implied
assumption of risk claims do not conduct a public policy analysis. So
long as the NFL could characterize concussion risks as inherent to the
sport, implied assumption of risk would theoretically protect the league,
even when an express waiver would be inconsistent with public policy.
Theoretically, there is no doctrinal problem with this outcome
because the two defenses concern different risks. As discussed above,
implied assumption of risk only covers risks that are inherent to the
sport. It does not relieve the defendant of its duty to protect against
extraneous or noninherent risks resulting from negligence. Express
assumption of risk, on the other hand, crosses this line. It is a complete
defense that relieves the defendant of any duty of care, outside of those
relating to intentional torts or gross negligence.143 As a result, the law
140. See supra Section EI.B. 1 and accompanying notes.
141. See supra Part HA.
142. See supra Part IIA.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (AM. IAW INST. 1979).
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imposes a public policy test for a defendant seeking to defend himself
on express assumption of risk grounds.
Theory aside, however, it seems unsettling and incongruous to
hold that the NFL could lose on express assumption of risk yet win on
implied. The next section evaluates whether this dichotomy is
defensible as a matter of doctrine and of the functional goals of the tort
system, arguing that the distinction between express and implied
assumption of risk is not as clear as the doctrine appears to suggest.
IV. RETHINKING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN IMPLIED AND EXPRESS
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
There are three central problems with the doctrinal distinction
between express and implied assumption of risk. The first is that the
line between what risks are inherent and extraneous to an activity is
ambiguous. Second, not using a public policy backstop with implied
assumption of risk is inconsistent with the principle of tort law to
consider policy when making duty decisions. Finally, the distinction is
inconsistent with the Restatement and undermines the deterrence and
compensatory functions of tort law.
Given these deficiencies, this Article recommends that courts
infuse public policy into the implied assumption of risk analysis and
that future plaintiffs-in the NFL and elsewhere-lean on the
Restatement's guidance to persuade courts to do so.
A Ambiguity Between '7nherent" and "Extraneous"
When Cardozo decided Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.
in 1929, the distinction between the implied and express assumption of
risk defenses made sense.'" Cardozo found that the plaintiff assumed
the obvious risk of falling on a spinning fair ride called The Flopper,
since the plaintiff had watched the ride send the bodies of participants
"tumbling" before climbing aboard.145 However, Cardozo found the
plaintiff could not have assumed the risk that operator negligence
would subject him to extraneous, or non-inherent, risks.146 Cardozo
explicitly noted that the court's calculus would have been quite different
had the plaintiff proceeded under a theory of defective equipment.147
Since 1929, however, drawing the line between inherent and
extraneous risks has proven problematic for courts. Specifically, there
144. See Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 175.
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seem to be three major problems in the realm of athletic risks. First,
because judges lack expertise in deciding what is "inherent" to a sport,
inconsistent and unpredictable results mark case law. Second, using
the rules of a game as dividing principles is problematic for a number
of reasons. The rules themselves may be suspect and controlled by one
party, and the rules are subject to wholly opposite interpretations.
Third, because participants as a group cannot reliably know what risks
are "extraneous"-as opposed to intrinsic-to the nature of an activity,
such as football, it is not fair to say they knowingly assumed only
inherent risks.
1. Judicial Incompetency
To begin, the classification of risks as inherent or extraneous is
a question of law reserved for judges.148 In practice, judges tend to rely
on gut intuition when making this classification. This, of course, is
problematic, as judges often have no expertise in the activity itself.
Knight v. Jewett is perhaps the most illustrative example.49
Tasked with answering whether implied assumption of risk should bar
recovery for a plaintiff injured during a recreational touch football
game, the California Supreme Court held that liability only attaches to
defendants when they "intentionally injure|] another player or engage[]
in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport."50 The standard ultimately led
the court to engage in the nearly impossible task of determining what
is "ordinary" activity in a touch football game.15 Predictably, the court
split, with the plurality holding for the defendant.52
Ensuing California cases followed Knight's lead. In West v.
Sundown Little League of Stockton, Inc., for example, a California
appeals court made the decision that a Little League's coach's decision
to hit fly balls into the sun may have been risky, but not out of the
normal scope of a baseball practice.53 To contrast, in Galliardi v.
148. See Griffin v. Haunted Hotel, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 838-39. (Ct. App. 2015)
("Which risks are inherent in a given recreational activity is suitable for resolution on summary
judgment. Such a determination is a legal question within the province of the courts and is reached
from common knowledge. The court may also consider its 'own or common experience with the
recreational activity ... and documentary evidence introduced by the parties on a motion for
summary judgment." (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original)).
149. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992).
150. Dean Richardson, Player Violence: An Essay on Torts and Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 133, 156 (2004) (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 711).
151. Knight, 834 P.2d at 710-12.
152. Id.
153. West v. Sundown Little League of Stockton, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 849, 851, 857-58
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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Seahorse Riding Club, a California appeals court overturned a trial
court's decision that a horse-riding instructor was reasonable for setting
practice jumps that the court determined were dangerously high.xs4
The West court recited the facts of Galliardi, but failed to distinguish
the cases outside of noting that "[h]ere, we have no similar conduct on
the part of the defendants [in each case]."165 In other words, the court
relied on its gut intuition to define what was "ordinary" in a baseball
practice. With limited to no knowledge among judges about the
inherent risks of football, baseball, horseback riding, or any other sport,
inconsistent and unpredictable results are inevitable.
2. Rules of the Game as Dividing Principles
Perhaps then, the court should rely on bright-line rules to make
the classification. Attempts to do so, however, have also proven
problematic. In Hackbart, the court relied on the NFL's prohibition on
intentional blows to the head.156 The approach of using an activity's
written rules as a guide for their decisions has some support in other
courts as well. 57 The Knight dissent specifically noted that the implied
assumption of risk doctrine could be more fairly applied to professional,
organized sports than it could be to the backyard football game because
of the "well established modes of play."158
Using the rules of the game as dividing lines between inherent
and extraneous risks is also suspect, however. Consider as an example
one widely discussed aspect of professional football: allowing players to
return to games after suffering a head-to-head collision.159 The current
concussion protocol prohibits any player exhibiting any symptom of a
concussion from returning to play until he has been evaluated and
cleared by an independent neurologist.160
However, using this rule on returning to play as a determinant
of whether a player's concussion-related injury was inherent to the
sport or due to the league's negligence has two major problems: the
rules may be themselves suspect or biased, and the rules are subject to
wholly opposite interpretations that hinge on philosophical views
beyond the scope of tort law.
First, the rule itself is suspect. The NFL is far from a neutral
party when it comes to concussions in football. Its business is based on
154. Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
155. West, 116 Cal. Rptr 2d. at 858.
156. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520-22 (10th Cir. 1979).
157. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 723 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Kilgore, supra note 129.
160. See generally NATL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 127.
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viewership and, although the trend may be changing,161 football fans
traditionally celebrated big hits on Sunday. Until 2006, ESPN had a
Monday night segment titled "Jacked Up" in which commentators
ranked and celebrated the most violent hits from the weekend's
action.162 In 2010, the NFL faced criticism after it began selling photos
of an illegal hit that may have left receiver Mohamed Massaquoi
concussed on the field.163 And even today, in the midst of criticism that
the game is too violent, a sizeable portion of players, fans, and even the
current US president resent that football has grown "soft."164
Thus, at least for some of its fans, hard hits still sell in the NFL.
It should thus come as no surprise that the league's concussion protocol
has been widely criticized-as the NFL clearly faces conflicting
interests.65 But if the protocol itself is suspect, and if it may reflect.
negligent rule design or a bias in favor of harder hits, there is reason to
question whether it should be used as a guide for a court's thinking.
A second problem with using the concussion protocol rule as a
dividing line is that it is subject to multiple interpretations. In a
concussion action, parties may rely on a rule allowing players to return
to a game post-collision to argue either that concussions are so
predictable that they demand a protocol (and thus they are inherent
risks)166 or that concussions after returning to play are due to a rules
violation (and thus they are extraneous risks).167
Scholars have already made precisely these arguments. Some
view concussions post return as extraneous risks that players cannot
assume.168 Josh Hunsucker, for instance, argues that coaches' duty to
161. See Joe Drape, '1he American Dilemma'. Why Do We Still Watch Football?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/sports/football/watch-nfl-dilemma.html
[https://perma.cc/DS8A-PN3L].
162. Howard Bryant, The Risky Business of Football's Future, ESPN (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://www.espn.comlespn/commentary/newastory?page=bryant/101027 [https*//perma.cc/
ADB6-X5N5].
163. See Gregg Rosenthal, League Is Selling Photo of James Harrison's Illegal Hit, NBC
SPORTS (Oct. 19, 2010, 11:12 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/10/19/eague-is-
selling-photo-of-james-harrisons-illegal-hit/ [https://perma.ccIW4W4-S56M].
164. See Bill Pennington, Trump Says N.F.L. is Getting Soft. Players Hit Back, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/sports/nfl-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/6HGA-9KG6].
165. See, e.g., DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 19, at 11-20; Tom Schad, Concussion
Expert Has Issues with NFL's Protocol After Jacoby Brissett Incident, USA TODAY (Nov. 13, 2017,
4:03 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sportslnfl/colts/2017/11/13/concussion-expert-chris-
nowinski-has-issues-nfl-protocol-brissett/859195001/ [https://perma.cclUAF5-F3J6].
166. See Amy L. Bernstein, Into the Red Zone: How the National Football League's Quest
to Curb Concussions and Concussion-Related Injuries Could Affect Players' Legal Recovery, 22
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 271, 305-06 (2012).
167. See, e.g., Josh Hunsucker, Buckle Your Chinstrap: Why Youth, High School, and
College Football Should Adopt the NFL's Concussion Management Policies and Procedures, 45
MCGEORGE L. REv. 801, 817 (2014).
168. See, e.g., id.
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protect players from increased risk requires them to ensure a concussed
player does not return to the game.169 Heather MacGillivray makes a
similar argument by leaning on the science of concussions,170 noting the
following:
[Elven if the athlete has exhibited symptoms and was, at one point, previously told
about the risks of playing with a concussion, the potentially concussed athlete still
cannot validly assume the risk because his cognitive ability and neuropsychological
functioning is undeniably compromised.... [The only safeguards in place to prevent
the athlete from returning to play are the medical personnel, athletic trainers, and
coaches on the sidelines.1 7'
From this perspective, the failure to properly diagnose and
prevent an injured athlete's premature return represents an elevated
risk to the sport that the player could not have assumed. After all, the
risk of playing football may very well be a concussion, but the risk of
premature return is long-term, debilitating brain damage.172
Other commentators, such as Amy Bernstein, have taken the
opposite view, using the existence of the protocol to argue that the risks
of concussions and CTE are in fact inherent.173 An inherent risk has
been defined in tort law as one that is both "open and obvious" and
unavoidable within the context of the activity.'7 ' Between a rule
intended to protect players from repeat concussions after return to play
and "all the new .. . information floating around ... on the connection
between concussions and degenerative neurological diseases" Bernstein
argues it seems fair to characterize the risks of concussions generally
as open and obvious.'75
Furthermore, if players hide and understate their symptoms to
continue playing-a trend that Bernstein documents convincingly176-
then perhaps the risk of players incurring long-term brain injuries is,
at least to some degree, unavoidable. From that perspective, so long as
169. Id.
170. MacGillivray, supra note 34, at 565.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 566-67.
173. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 168, at 306.
174. 6 B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW: TORTS § 1501(c) (11th ed. 2018)
(stating that "inherent risk" is defined by asking "whether the risk that led to plaintiffs injury
involved some feature or aspect of the game that is inevitable or unavoidable in the actual playing
of the game.").
175. Bernstein, supra note 166, at 305-06.
176. See id. at 306-07. Bernstein draws on the case of quarterback Jon Kitna to display the
point. Id. In 2007, after taking a particularly harsh hit, Kitna left the game with symptoms of
memory loss, severe head pain, and dizziness. Id. The team physician informed him he had a
concussion. Id. At halftime, however, he claimed to be free of any pain or complications, and by the
fourth quarter, "with his team losing, the team doctor cleared him to return to the field." Id.
Bernstein notes that "[tihe argument that players need to be protected from themselves stands on
shaky grounds when a player such as Kitna can influence medical decisions" by lying or
understating their symptoms. Id. at 307.
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the players are informed of the risks, perhaps they should bear the full
burden of the consequences.7 7
The rift between MacGillivray's and Bernstein's perspectives is
rooted in questions that surpass the law. Issues of autonomy,
paternalism, and players' capacity to appreciate risk lurk dominantly
in the background, and this is just with respect to the rule banning
potentially concussed players to return to play. The same complexity
and arguments exist in relation to any rule of the game relating to
concussions and traumatic brain injuries. To take another example,
head-to-head hits are technically banned, but should an opposing
player, or the league, bear legal liability for each violation? On one
hand, the fact that there is a rule banning the illegal hits suggests the
risk is open and obvious and players themselves have contended they
are unavoidable.178 Perhaps players should have to accept that these
hits, while technically illegal, are still just part of the game. On the
other hand, however, the hits are against the rules and seemingly
increase the risk of the game.179 The NFL is in the best position to
protect players from the injuries resulting from these hits, and it has
attempted to protect players by setting rules that prohibit such hits.
Again, there is no easy answer, and what one decides likely depends on
philosophical views that exceed tort law.
What the analysis does make clear, however, is that drawing a
bright-line rule based on the rules of football is just as problematic as
judicial intuition. Primarily, the defendant creates the rules.'ao Far
from objective reflections of the true nature of football, game rules are
compromises that work to advance the NFL's interests. More
importantly, the rules can support wholly opposite interpretations in
litigation. Both issues make the rules of play an unreliable legal
standard for defining inherent versus extraneous risks.
3. Players Cannot Fairly Be Said to Have Knowingly Assumed
Inherent Risks
There seems to be an even more fundamental flaw with using
inherency as the sole test for upholding implied assumption of risk with
177. See id. at 306-07.
178. As safety Mike Mitchell noted, the speed of the game simply makes these types of
collisions unavoidable at times. See Fowler, supra note 8 ("He's 4.4-4.3 speed. Aim that. You go do
that. You can't. It's just the risk of playing football. If a ball is in the air and the man jumps and a
man ducks his head, how do you want me to readjust my body. You cannot do it.").
179. See Bill Pennington, The N.F.L. Struggles to Tackle Its Latest Problem: Tacking, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https*//www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/sportsnfl-week-1-tackling-rule.html
[https://perma.ccl3XHJ-VRL8].
180. See 2018 NFL Rulebook, NFL: OPERATIONS, https//operations.nfl.com/the-rules/2018-
nfl-rulebook/#2018-rule-changes [https*//perma.ccY9MC-4BAJ] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
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respect to professional football. Not only is distinguishing inherent
from extraneous risks problematic for judges, but it is also incredibly
difficult for players. The doctrine, however, implicitly assumes that
players can and do make these distinctions before deciding to play.
Asserting that players assume the risk of all inherent risks in a
game implies they know which risks are inherent and which are
extraneous to the game-that is, which risks are and are not the
product of the league's negligence. The most basic definition of
negligence is failing to take precautions for which the safety gains
outweigh the cost.18 Judges seldom ever actually take on Learned
Hand's formula, but they do ask the basic question behind it: What
could the defendant have done to avoid the accident?182
The average NFL player is in no position to know the universe
of steps the league could have taken to better protect them from
traumatic brain injuries. The case at hand is far from the simple
example of The Flopper, where operator negligence would have been
easy for a layperson to conceptualize before getting on the ride. In
professional football, the line is much harder to draw. Should the
league stop every player who endures a head-to-head collision from
returning to play? Should it inflict longer suspensions or pay cuts on
players who initiate those hits? Should it bring in more doctors and
technology to the sidelines? Better helmets? Softer turf? Require
commentators to condemn such hits during and after games?
The answer is not obvious to anyone,'8 let alone the player
signing an NFL contract. Yet if a player does not know what foregone
precautions would have made the game less risky, per Learned Hand's
basic definition of negligence, he cannot possibly know what actions of
the league constitute negligence. And if he cannot know what actions
constitute negligence, it is not fair to say he knew which risks were
extraneous and, therefore, which risks were inherent to the game when
he signed up to play.
The line between inherent and extraneous risks is too
ambiguous to be used to distinguish between implied and express
assumptions of risk. Dividing "inherent" from "extraneous" is a task
replete with complications, ambiguities, and sport-specific questions
that make it challenging, if not impossible, for a court to do
competently. Moreover, accepting players' participation as proof of
181. See T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932).
182. See Gregory C. Keating, Must the Hand Formula Not Be Named?, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
367, 368 (2015).
183. Even concussion experts are still not entirely clear on what steps must be taken. For
the most recent recommendations, see generally DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 19.
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their assumption of risk rests on unrealistic assumptions about players'
knowledge.
B. Failing to Incorporate a Public Policy Analysis Is Inconsistent with
the Principles of Tort Law
Even if inherent and extraneous risks were clearly
distinguishable, there remains an even larger problem with the
doctrinal distinction between express and implied assumption of risk.
Recall that in order to succeed on an express assumption of risk defense,
a defendant must prove that the waiver is consistent with public
policy.184 Failing to require the same showing on implied assumption
of.risk defenses is inconsistent with the well-established principle in
tort law of using policy to inform duty decisions.
The doctrinal rationale for imposing greater scrutiny on express
assumptions of risk through a public policy analysis is that in express
assumption cases, the defendant escapes the duty to take precautions
against all risks-including not only inherent but also extraneous
risks.185 Express assumption of risk cases absolve defendants of all
duties owed, while implied assumption of risk cases are less about duty
and more about the plaintiffs agreement to take on some risks
voluntarily.186 This logic only holds, however, if one approaches implied
assumption of risk as a contract problem; that is, if one accepts the
premise that the implied assumption defense is less about limiting the
duty of the defendant and more about the plaintiffs subjective
recognition and acceptance of the risk in an activity.
Taking a closer look at the risk assumption doctrine, however, it
is clear that implied assumption of risk actually derives from
limitations on duty, not a meeting of the minds in which plaintiffs and
defendants agree to apportion risks. Some jurisdictions, such as
California, have explicitly made this point.'87 In Griffin v. Haunted
Trail, for example, the court stated that the plaintiffs "subjective state
of mind is simply irrelevant in this context. Because primary
assumption of risk focuses on the question of duty, it is not dependent
on either the plaintiffs implied consent to, or subjective appreciation of,
the potential risk."188
184. See supra Section IIA3.
185. See Drago, supra note 54, at 586.
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. (c)(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Drago,
supra note 54, at 590-91.
187. See Griffin v. Haunted Hotel, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 842 (Ct. App. 2015).
188. Id. The case involved a plaintiff alleging negligence against a Halloween haunted
house and trail attraction after he was injured while fleeing from a chainsaw-wielding actor (albeit
without the chains) in a section of the trail made to look like an exit. Id. at 836. The plaintiff argued
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From this perspective, instead of "ask[ing] what risks a
particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter," the
court "must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the
defendant's role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine
whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from the
particular risk of harm."1 89 In other words, California approaches the
implied assumption of risk as a problem of defining the scope of
defendants' duty, rather than defining the scope of risks that the
plaintiff subjectively appreciates and agrees to assume.
Several jurisdictions take the opposite approach and frame
implied assumption of risk in contract terms, placing the most
importance on the "plaintiffs implied consent to face a specific risk."19o
Yet courts in these jurisdictions nonetheless import questions of duty
into the analysis when they make the first step of classifying the risks
themselves as inherent or extraneous. Classifying a risk as "inherent"
is a question of law that must be answered before the court takes on the
issue of manifestation of consent. But once the court classifies a risk as
"inherent," the court has inescapably limited the defendant's duty. The
classification allows-even requires-the risk to be assumed, thereby
relieving the defendant from the duty to guard against it. In contrast,
when the court classifies a risk as extraneous, defendants are duty
bound to take reasonable precautions to minimize those risks.
Jurisdictions framing the defense as a matter of contract have not
transformed implied assumption of risk into a pure contract issue; they
have simply shifted the underlying duty question to an earlier decision
point: the point at which judges classify risks as inherent or not.
If implied assumption of risk is fundamentally a question of
duty, it is both significant and odd that courts decide such questions
without reference to public policy concerns. Elsewhere in tort law,
when courts consider duty, they are required to wrestle with public
policy. Specifically, in the most well-known example, Tarasoff v.
the risks were not inherent because he thought the attraction was over, but the court disagreed,
holding that the risk of being afraid and falling while fleeing was inherent to the attraction and
that the plaintiffs subjective understanding of the risks and the boundaries of the attraction was
irrelevant. Id. at 841-44; see also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 709 (Cal. 1992) ("[C]ontrary to
the implied consent approach to the doctrine of assumption of risk ... the duty approach provides
an answer which does not depend on the particular plaintiffs subjective knowledge or appreciation
of the potential risk.... Rather than being dependent on the knowledge or consent of the particular
plaintiff, resolution of the question of the defendant's liability in such cases turis on whether the
defendant had a legal duty to avoid such conduct. . . .").
189. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 309 (Cal. 2006).
190. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 52, at 615; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 496C cmt. (b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (noting that, in implied assumption of risk, even though the
plaintiff does not expressly consent to the risk, "by voluntarily electing to proceed, with the
knowledge of the risk ... he manifests his willingness to accept it.").
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University of California, the California Supreme Court evaluated the
foreseeability of harm, the certainty that the plaintiff would suffer
injury, the link between the defendant's actions and the injury, the
moral blame attributed to defendant, the protection against future
harm, the extent of the burden that added protection would place on the
defendant, and the availability of insurance for the plaintiff.191 Since
Tarasoff, courts have looked to these factors and a host of other policy
considerations to decide duty.192 In addition, as discussed above, when
a defendant raises an express assumption of risk defense to limit duty,
public policy is very much at play through the Tunkl factors or similar
concerns.193
Suffice to say, duty is a policy-driven determination elsewhere
in tort law. Courts rely on public policy concerns as a backstop
whenever they decide to impose or withhold a duty of care. Whether or
not a court characterizes implied assumption of risk as a question about
the scope of defendants' duty, it is inherently making a duty
determination with respect to implied assumption of risk defense. Yet
in practice across US jurisdictions, courts applying implied assumption
of risk doctrines do so without any consideration of public policy. The
treatment of implied assumption of risk, therefore, is inconsistent with
the basic principle in tort law of using policy to inform duty
determinations. This is yet another reason courts should infuse the
review of implied assumption of risk defenses with public policy
analyses.
191. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).
192. See Estate of Mickelsen ex rel. Mickelsen v. North-Wend Foods, Inc., 274 P.3d 1193,
1199 (Alaska 2012) (using a three-step process to determine whether duty of care exists: "First,
[the court] look[s] for duty imposed by statute. If none exists, [it] then determine [s] if the current
case falls in the class of cases controlled by existing precedent. If no closely related case law exists,
[it] weigh[s] the public policy considerations"); Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929
P.2d 582, 591 (Cal. 1997) (applying factors to impose duty to not misrepresent information that
creates risk to the plaintiff); HealthONE v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 888 (Colo.
2002) (employing risk-utility test considering: (1) magnitude of risk; (2) relationship of parties; (3)
nature of attendant risk; (4) opportunity and ability to exercise care; (5) foreseeability of harm;
and (6) policy interest in proposed solution); Lindstrom v. City of Corry, 763 A.2d 394, 397 (Pa.
2000) ("In determining whether a duty exists, a court must weigh several discrete factors,
including: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of actor's conduct; (3) the
nature of risk imposed and foreseeability of harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing duty
upon actor; and (5) the overall public interest in proposed solution.").
193. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444-46 (Cal. 1963); supra Section
III.A.
684 [Vol. 21:3:651
EVALUATING A "CONCUSSION CLAUSE"
C. Failing to Incorporate a Public Policy Analysis Is Inconsistent with
the Restatement and the Functions of Tort Law
In addition to being inconsistent with the above principle of tort
law, failing to evaluate implied assumption of risk claims on the basis
of public policy is also inconsistent with the second Restatement of
Torts and the deterrence and compensatory functions of tort law. In
defining implied assumption of risk, the Restatement explicitly says
that the defense "does not apply in any situation in which an express
agreement to accept the risk would be invalid as contrary to public
policy."1 94 In the illustrations, the Restatement expands on this rule by
noting "where agreements between employer and employee are held
ineffective to make the employee assume the risk of the employer's
negligence, it is quite logical to conclude that the acceptance of a
particular risk by the conduct of the employee is equally contrary to
public policy." 95
Restatements are not binding on courts, and this provision
appears to be widely neglected by courts and litigants alike; it was not
raised in any of the implied assumption of risk cases noted above.
Commentators on concussion litigation have also overlooked the
dichotomy between the two defenses, as well as this effort by the
Restatement o reconcile them.
The Restatement scenario is exactly the situation the NFL
concussion litigation presents. A hypothetical exculpatory waiver by
the league to escape liability for concussion injuries would likely be
unenforceable. Yet, it seems that the league could still invoke an
implied assumption of risk defense by classifying the risks of CTE and
traumatic brain injuries as inherent instead of extraneous. The
Restatement's guidance makes it clear that courts should not allow
these types of defenses to succeed.196
While courts have yet to follow this advice, it nonetheless
meshes with the deterrence and compensatory functions of tort law. As
it stands, a defendant in the NFL's position could avoid liability with a
legal sleight of hand. Classifying the same risk-traumatic brain
injuries in the case of professional football-as inherent would protect
the NFL from the liability it would likely face had the risks been
classified as extraneous and waived in a Concussion Clause. The
current law, therefore, allows defendants like the NFL to avoid the
scrutiny of a public policy analysis and therefore avoid liability all
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
195. Id. illus. j.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C(2).
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together by winning the classification debate and characterizing certain
risks as inherent to the sport of football.
This incongruence creates a host of deterrence and
compensatory problems.197 The wrongdoing of the defendant, after all,
is not undone by the classification; the wrongdoing is that plaintiffs are
assuming risks that run contrary to public policy concerns. Defendants
can curtail the level of protection they provide, and plaintiffs who sue
will not be compensated for the harms they endure. There are plenty
of reasons, therefore, to argue that the NFL should not be able to protect
itself with implied assumption of risk, if it could not do so via express
assumption of risk. The following section recommends actions courts
and plaintiffs should take to reconcile their application of implied and
express assumption of risk doctrines.
D. Positive Recommendation
As argued above, the doctrinal distinction between the two
versions of assumption of risk is deeply problematic and lacks a sound
doctrinal foundation.s98 The difference between courts' treatment of
these two defenses rests on a distinction between inherent and
extraneous risks that is ambiguous, activity specific, and nearly
impossible to apply competently.'" Furthermore, it is inconsistent with
the guidance of the Restatement, as well as the principles and functions
of tort law. Courts and plaintiffs alike should therefore take action to
ensure that risks that could not be assumed expressly cannot
alternatively be assumed impliedly.
First, plaintiffs in professional football concussion litigation
facing the league's implied assumption of risk defense should bring new
doctrinal and public policy concerns into their counterarguments. In
addition to focusing on information asymmetries, they should argue for
courts to follow the guidance of the Restatement and point out the
deficiencies in the current doctrine described above. Furthermore,
players should include the relevant jurisdiction's public policy test for
express assumption of risk to argue that allowing plaintiffs to impliedly
assume the risks of concussions and traumatic brain injuries should be
rejected as a matter of public policy.
Courts should also begin to implement their own procedures to
follow the guidance of the Restatement. Importantly, courts need not
design a new test to meet this need. The Restatement simply calls for
197. See KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14-19 (5th ed.
2017).
198. See supra Section IV.A.
199. See supra Section IVA.
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the implied assumption of risk defense to be barred "in any situation in
which an express agreement to accept the risk would be invalid as
contrary to public policy."200 Thus, courts merely need to afford implied
assumption of risk the same public policy treatment they give to
exculpatory waivers.
Under this approach, courts' analyses of assumption of risk
would not end with the classification of a risk as inherent or extraneous.
Even if courts were to classify the risks of traumatic brain injuries in
football as inherent, they would be required to consider the facts
through the same public policy lens they utilize when evaluating
express assumption of risk defenses. The above analysis reasons that
such steps would likely result in courts' rejection of implied assumption
of risk defenses, but courts may differ in the outcome-if, for example,
some courts do not view football as a matter of public importance. Even
if courts do not reach the same result, however, subjecting implied
assumption of risk claims to analysis on public policy grounds will be a
welcome advancement and a correction to a puzzling and unjustified
inconsistency in tort law.
V. CONCLUSION
Ninety-nine percent of studied retired NFL players' brains show
signs of CTE.201 While the NFL may have settled the issue for the time
being, this problem is destined to resurface.202 New plaintiffs will
emerge, and it is merely a matter of time before courts must consider
the merits of a concussion-based negligence claim. Assumption of risk
will undoubtedly be one of the most important issues, yet the doctrine
currently harbors a troubling loophole.
As it stands, the NFL likely could not be able to protect itself
from negligence suits by requiring players to sign an exculpatory
waiver. Such a waiver would implicate a host of public policy problems.
Yet under the current doctrine, it seems the league would nonetheless
be able to avoid liability under an implied assumption of risk defense
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C(2).
201. See Mez et al., supra note 22, at 362; Joe Ward, Josh Williams & Sam Manchester,
111 N.F.L. Brains. All but One Had C.T.E., N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/25/sports/football/nfl-cte.html
[https//perma.ccIE93V-72FP].
202. See Ward, Williams & Manchester, supra note 203. For more information on the
settlement and potential for future litigation, see, e.g., Ken Belson, Debilitated Players Accuse
N.F.L. of Stalling on Settlement Payments, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017),
https*//www.nytimes.com/2017/11113/sports/football/nfl-concussion-lawsuit.html
[https*//perma.cc/L33M-HW5E].
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by classifying the risks of CTE and traumatic brain injuries as inherent
to the game.
As set forth in this Article, there are three major problems with
this aspect of the doctrine. Primarily, an implied assumption of risk
defense rests on an unusable distinction between inherent and
extraneous risks. Further, while the distinction seems logical in theory,
in reality the concepts are deeply ambiguous and inextricably
intertwined with sport-specific questions beyond most judges' expertise.
More importantly, even if courts could competently classify risks as
inherent or extraneous, they would be left with a holding that is
inconsistent with the functions of tort law, the Restatement, and basic
policy considerations.
The impendency of CTE litigation makes clear that it is time to
rethink the way common law courts apply the implied assumption of
risk defense. The analysis should include policy considerations,
especially in cases involving the NFL where an express waiver would
be unenforceable as inconsistent with public policy. Anything less risks
blurring tort doctrine, allowing defendants to skirt their duties of care,
and barring deserving plaintiffs from much-needed recovery.
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